Mahayana Commentary on the Hundred Verses, Volume II

Original Text: Moreover, the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi) is generally of two kinds. The first is innate (sahaja). The second is acquired through discrimination (parikalpita). The innate view of self arises continuously in conjunction with the body due to the inherent power of internal causes since beginningless time. It does not rely on erroneous teachings or erroneous discrimination but arises spontaneously. Therefore, it is called innate. This is further divided into two kinds. The first is perpetually continuous. Residing in the seventh consciousness (manas), it takes the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) as its object, giving rise to the appearance of one's own mind, which is then grasped as "self." This is called the view of self.

Explanation: The view of self is broadly of two kinds: innate view of self and acquired view of self. The innate view of self arises due to the fundamental ignorance (avidyā) within the mental faculty (manas) since beginningless time. It perpetually accompanies the five-aggregate body (pañca-skandha) throughout lifetimes without separation. It does not depend on erroneous teachings from the intellect (mano-vijñāna) nor on contamination by erroneous discriminations of the intellect. The mental faculty spontaneously gives rise to this view, apprehending the five aggregates as "self" and "belonging to self." Therefore, it is called the innate view of self—a view inherently possessed by the mental faculty along with the five-aggregate body, present even in the womb, where the embryo is mistaken as "self" and "belonging to self."

The innate view of self can further be divided into two kinds. The first continues perpetually across lifetimes without interruption and will persist into the future unless genuinely eradicated after realizing the truth of non-self. How does this view arise? Due to the mental faculty’s ignorance since beginningless time, it regards all dharmas produced and sustained by the eighth consciousness as "self" and "belonging to self," thereby generating attachment to all dharmas. This is called the consciousness of erroneous discrimination (parikalpita-vijñāna), which fundamentally fails to recognize the true reality of the dharma realm—that all dharmas originate from and belong to the eighth consciousness. Thus, this is termed inverted view or erroneous grasping.

Overall, the mental faculty’s view of self is called the view of dharmas as self (dharma-ātma-dṛṣṭi), appropriating all dharmas as one’s own. Within this, the mental faculty’s apprehension of the five aggregates—produced and sustained by the eighth consciousness—as "self" and "belonging to self" constitutes a perverted, erroneous view known as the view of the five aggregates as self (skandha-ātma-dṛṣṭi). From this view of self arises the clinging to self (ātma-grāha). This view can only be eradicated through the cultivation of the Four Noble Truths (catvāri ārya-satyāni). Only after its eradication can the mental faculty’s clinging to the five-aggregate body gradually diminish and cease. When clinging to self is fully extinguished, one transcends the three realms (traidhātuka) and attains liberation.

Original Text: The second [innate view of self] is intermittent. Residing in the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna), it takes the five aggregates subject to clinging (pañcopādāna-skandha) as its object. It gives rise to the appearance of one's own mind either collectively or individually, which is then grasped as "self." This is called the view of self. These two kinds of innate view of self are subtle and difficult to eradicate. Only through repeated cultivation of the superior contemplation of non-self (anātma-vipaśyanā) can they be eliminated.

Explanation: The second kind of innate view of self refers to the intermittent view of self belonging to the intellect (mano-vijñāna). When the intellect takes the five aggregates subject to clinging as its object—either grasping the collective appearance of the aggregates as "self" and "belonging to self," or grasping individual aspects of the aggregates as such—it apprehends the five aggregates as "self" and "belonging to self." This is the intellect’s view of self. The arising of the intellect’s view of self requires a prerequisite: the intellect must comprehend the characteristics of the five aggregates, recognize their features, and understand their functions and implications. Only then can the view of self arise; otherwise, it does not.

For example, when the intellect regards the function of eye-consciousness seeing forms as "self" and "belonging to self," it must first know that seeing is occurring, that "I am seeing," and possess the concept of "I." If the concept of "I" has not yet been formed through conditioning, there is no view of self. For instance, a newborn infant lacks discriminative power toward its parents and does not recognize them. Thus, anyone may hold the infant without objection. As it grows older and recognizes its parents, it knows "these are my parents," develops attachment to them, and resists being held or cared for by others.

At birth, an infant lacks discriminative power toward food and has unclear self-awareness. It does not regard food as "self" or "belonging to self" and thus does not cling to it. Parents may give its food to other children without the infant objecting, crying, or showing anger. As it matures further, it develops recognition of "self" and "others," and of objects like food, clothing, and toys. Then the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi) and view of belongings (ātmiya-dṛṣṭi) arise, leading to clinging to possessions and resistance to others touching them. Therefore, the intellect’s view of self is not innate; it arises through postnatal learning and cognition, relying also on conditioning from the mental faculty to develop the view of self and belongings.

These two kinds of innate view of self—belonging to the mental faculty and the intellect—are extremely subtle in their manifestation and thus difficult to eradicate. Only through constant, uninterrupted cultivation of the superior contemplation of non-self, through prolonged conditioning, can they be eliminated. Therefore, eradicating the mental faculty’s innate view of self is not easy. Unless the innate view of self is eradicated, the mental faculty’s innate clinging to self cannot be severed, because clinging to self depends on the view of self—where there is view of self, there is clinging to self.

Original Text: The acquired view of self (parikalpita ātma-dṛṣṭi) arises due to external conditions in the present life. It is not innate to the body but depends on erroneous teachings and erroneous discrimination to arise. Therefore, it is called acquired. This is also of two kinds. The first arises by taking the characteristics of the aggregates as described by erroneous teachings as its object, giving rise to the appearance of one's own mind, which is discriminated as "self." This is called the view of self. The second arises by taking the characteristics of "self" as described by erroneous teachings as its object, giving rise to the appearance of one's own mind, which is discriminated as "self." This is called the view of self. These are the two kinds of acquired view of self.

Explanation: The second kind of view of self is the acquired view of self, which also belongs to the intellect. This view arises due to conditioning from the postnatal environment; it is not innate to the five-aggregate body and does not accompany it from birth. It requires exposure to others’ erroneous teachings to emerge, along with the arising of erroneous discriminations, before the intellect’s view of self can manifest. Subsequently, the intellect’s view of self conditions the mental faculty, strengthening the mental faculty’s view of self and clinging to self.

The acquired view of self is also divided into two kinds. The first arises by taking as its object others’ incorrect teachings about the five aggregates—such as "this is the form aggregate," "this is the feeling aggregate, perception aggregate, volitional formation aggregate, and consciousness aggregate," "this is my bodily form," "this is my sensation," "this is my cognition," "these are my thoughts and concepts," "this is my decision," "this is done by me." One then regards these functions and activities as one’s own aggregates of form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness. This is called the acquired view of self.

The second kind of acquired view of self arises by taking as its object others’ erroneous teachings about the characteristics of "self"—such as "this is me," "I am like this"—thereby regarding all such appearances as "self," giving rise in the mind to the appearance of "self" and thus the view of self. This describes the meaning of these two kinds of acquired view of self.