The Identity View Explained in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra

Original text of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra:大慧。身见有二种。谓俱生及妄想。如缘起妄想。自性妄想。

Explanation: In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the Buddha says that identity view (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) has two kinds: one is innate identity view (sahaja-satkāya-dṛṣṭi), the identity view that the five aggregates possess from birth, which is the manas's identity view, and this needs to be eliminated; the other is imputed identity view (parikalpita-satkāya-dṛṣṭi). "Imputed" (妄想) means false and unreal, not true and correct; "conception" (想) means discriminating and grasping at marks, grasping them as real, grasping them as self and belonging to self. Therefore, when there is imputed conception, there is also identity view, and imputed identity view also needs to be eliminated.

There are many kinds of imputed conception, such as delusive construction regarding dependent arising (缘起妄想)—not viewing the dharmas born from various causes and conditions as they really are, but falsely grasping these dependently arisen dharmas as self and as belonging to self, not knowing that these dharmas are all born from causes and conditions, all being unreal, impermanent, arising and ceasing, subject to change, and suffering, and not being self or belonging to self. Delusive construction regarding dependent arising includes not only the mind consciousness's imputed conception but even more the manas's imputed conception, and both kinds of imputed conception must be eliminated—one should no longer impute that dependently arisen dharmas are self and belong to self, for fundamentally they are not.

Delusive construction of own-nature (自性妄想) is the view that all dharmas have inherent self-nature, have real existence, are reliable, and can be depended upon, and so one grasps them as self and as belonging to self. Within this kind of imputed conception there is both the mind consciousness's imputed conception and, even more, the manas's imputed conception, and only when both kinds of imputed conception are eliminated is one who has eliminated self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi). Among the various kinds of imputed conception, the manas's imputed conception is primary and the mind consciousness's imputed conception is auxiliary.

Original text of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra:譬如依缘起自性。种种妄想自性计著生。以彼非有、非无、非有无。无实妄想相故。愚夫妄想。种种妄想。自性相计著。如热时焰。鹿渴水想。是须陀洹妄想身见。彼以人无我。摄受无性。断除久远无知计著。

Explanation: For example, relying on the own-nature of dependent arising, after grasping that dependently arisen dharmas have self-nature, all kinds of imputed conception arise, universally discriminating and clinging to dependently arisen dharmas, imputing that dependently arisen dharmas are non-existent or non-existent in non-existence, neither existing nor not existing, both existing and not existing. Because these notions are all unreal imputed illusory marks, they are all the imputed conceptions of ignorant ordinary beings. Ignorant ordinary beings give rise to all kinds of imputed conceptions regarding dependently arisen dharmas, clinging to dependently arisen dharmas as having the reality of inherent self-nature, grasping all the appearances of dependently arisen dharmas as real, as self and belonging to self.

It is like the illusory shimmering water appearing on the sand when the weather is hot, which a thirsty deer imputes to be real drinkable water. Ordinary beings, like the thirsty deer, take the unreal, illusory body of the five aggregates as a real self and as belonging to self, and ceaselessly grasp at it, craving birth and greedily clinging to life. A stream-enterer (Srotaāpanna) who has eliminated self-view, regarding this imputed identity view, contemplates as it really is that the body of the five aggregates has no self and nothing belonging to self, and realizes as it really is that the body of the five aggregates has no inherent self-nature, thereby eliminating his own beginningless habit of ignorant grasping at the body of the five aggregates.

The above imputed identity view still takes the manas's identity view as primary and the mind consciousness's identity view as auxiliary, because the text repeatedly speaks of all kinds of clinging to the self-nature of imputed conceptions, clinging to the marks of self-nature, and long-enduring ignorant clinging. All of these refer to the manas's imputed identity view, from which the mind consciousness's imputed identity view arises. The mind consciousness's imputed identity view is not long-enduring; it lasts only one lifetime and then ceases. The manas does not cease, causing the next lifetime's mind consciousness to again give rise to imputed identity view. Therefore, if in cultivation one does not properly deal with the deep-rooted problem of the manas, what one cultivates is merely superficial; it will arise again, and all efforts are made for nothing.