The Major Issue of Direct Perception and Non-Valid Cognition

Yesterday, someone analyzed various data indicators and predicted that the stock would rise by 10% today. As it turned out, the stock indeed rose by exactly 10% today, proving the prediction accurate. Was this person’s prediction from yesterday a case of direct perception (pratyakṣa)? Then, based on today's stock movements and technical data indicators, the same person analyzed and predicted that the stock would fall by 2% tomorrow. When tomorrow arrives, if the stock indeed falls by 2%, would today’s analysis and prediction be considered direct perception? Neither is direct perception. Both predictions are inferential cognition (anumāna). Even if the data is perfectly accurate, the stock market situation is not directly witnessed with one’s own eyes; therefore, it is not direct perception. Relying on data indicators to deduce, ponder, analyze, speculate, or reason is inferential cognition. If I predict that you will do something bad tomorrow, but you have not actually done it yet, then the act of wrongdoing is not a present fact—it is a prediction or speculation formed by isolated mental consciousness (manovijñāna). Therefore, it is not direct perception but inferential cognition. Direct perception would be witnessing him in the very act of doing something bad. But if, in reality, he is doing something good, what you perceive is also not direct perception but inferential cognition.  

I make two fists: one fist holds a one-yuan coin, the other is empty. Then I extend my right fist and ask someone: “Is there a coin in this fist?” After thinking for a moment, the other person says: “There is a coin.” Congratulations, they guessed correctly. Even so, this is still inferential cognition, not direct perception. Because this answer was not obtained through direct perception; it was guessed. If it were claimed to be observed through direct perception, they did not actually see whether there was a coin in the fist. If one had supernatural powers (ṛddhi), what is seen with the heavenly eye (divyacakṣus) is also direct perception. But since they lack such powers, what cannot be seen with the physical eye is not direct perception—it can only be guessing, imagining, or speculating, which is inferential cognition. Not witnessing the fact directly means it is inferential cognition, not direct perception.  

What, then, truly constitutes direct perception? Can everyone now genuinely understand this? Direct perception is the direct witnessing of a presently existing dharma (phenomenon), seen with one’s own eyes, real and without error. This is direct observation, the cognitive wisdom of direct perception. Dharmas that do not presently exist, phenomena not presently witnessed, and those arrived at purely through the speculative imagination of isolated mental consciousness are entirely inferential cognition. The stock market situation does not presently exist; one can only see it the next day. The current viewpoint or conclusion is not derived from direct witnessing; the mental speculation or estimation is, of course, the imagination of inferential cognition. No matter how accurate the estimation, it is not directly witnessed; it is not obtained through present observation of the stock market’s trend. Therefore, it is one hundred percent inferential cognition.

At the same time, it is not inference by analogy (upamāna) either, because there is no equal comparison between dharmas. Inference by analogy involves drawing a conclusion by comparing two or more dharmas that coexist and can be mutually compared. Without comparison, no conclusion can be drawn, nor can a decision be made. Can the cognitive wisdom, mental state, and experiential feeling (vedanā) of direct witnessing be the same as those of imagination? Can the mental state and experiential feeling of watching a loved one gradually die before one’s eyes be the same as imagining the future death of that loved one? Although everyone will inevitably die someday, imagining the death of a loved one who is still alive now—can the mental state and experiential feeling be the same as directly witnessing their death?

Many people, based on the Tathāgatagarbha (Buddha-nature) theory they have learned and its various functions, characteristics, and essential nature, speculate that the Tathāgatagarbha exists in a certain place, realm, root, or dharma, performing certain functions. Then they believe they have directly realized the Tathāgatagarbha, attained enlightenment, understood the mind, and become sages. This misunderstanding is enormous, and its consequences are severe. It is like a poor, lowly person imagining themselves as an emperor, taking this imagined state as real, and proclaiming themselves emperor. When the true emperor learns of this, he becomes furious, sends soldiers to arrest the imposter, and beheads him as a public example. To imagine the Tathāgatagarbha performing a certain function and then claim to be an enlightened sage carries consequences far more serious than public beheading. Therefore, one must be exceedingly cautious in spiritual practice.  

Where does the problem of grave false speech (mahā-mṛṣāvāda) lie? It lies in not understanding the distinction between direct perception and inferential cognition, not knowing what constitutes direct observation, and not realizing that what is deduced, analyzed, or pondered is essentially inferential cognition, not direct perception. Failing to distinguish between direct perception and inferential cognition is a very serious problem. Many people are unaware that the conclusions they reach are merely guesses or speculations, not direct perception witnessed with their own eyes. Therefore, when they derive certain conclusions through reasoning, they believe they have attained direct realization, when in fact it is entirely the imagination and speculative reasoning of inferential cognition. Especially for those without meditative concentration (dhyāna), it is all the functioning of mental derivation. Even those with shallow meditative concentration, or those with deep concentration who happen to be thinking while not in profound samādhi (meditative absorption), and thus use mental thought, are still engaging in the functioning of mental derivation. Therefore, it cannot be said that having meditative concentration necessarily means direct realization.