Yesterday, someone analyzed various data indicators and predicted that the stock would rise by 10% today. The result today indeed showed a 10% increase, precisely accurate. Was this person's prediction yesterday based on pratyakṣa (direct perception)? This same person, based on today's stock trends and technical data indicators, analyzed and predicted that the stock would fall by 2% tomorrow. When tomorrow arrives and the stock indeed falls by 2%, is the analysis and prediction made today based on pratyakṣa? Neither is pratyakṣa. The predictions are non-valid cognition (a-pramāṇa). Even if the data is perfectly accurate, the stock market situation is not personally witnessed; therefore, it is not pratyakṣa. Relying on data indicators to deduce, think, analyze, speculate, or reason is non-valid cognition. If I predict you will do something bad tomorrow, but right now you have not done it, then doing something bad is not a fact; it is predicted and speculated by the isolated mental consciousness (manas-vijñāna). Therefore, it is not pratyakṣa; it is non-valid cognition. Pratyakṣa is witnessing him in the act of doing something bad right now. But if, in essence, he is actually doing something good, what you perceive is also non-valid cognition.
I clench both fists; one fist holds a one-yuan coin, the other is empty. I then extend my right fist and ask someone: "Is there a coin in this fist?" The other person thinks for a moment and says: "There is a coin." Congratulations, they guessed correctly. But even so, it is non-valid cognition, not pratyakṣa. Because this answer was not obtained through their direct perceptual observation; it was guessed. If it were claimed to be observed through pratyakṣa, they did not actually see whether there was a coin in the fist. If they had supernatural powers (ṛddhi), perception via the divine eye (divya-cakṣus) would also be a form of direct seeing (pratyakṣa). But since they lack such powers, what the physical eye cannot see is not direct perception. It can only be guessing, imagining, or speculation—it is non-valid cognition. Not witnessing the fact is non-valid cognition, not pratyakṣa.
Can everyone now truly understand what exactly constitutes pratyṣa? Pratyakṣa is a presently existing phenomenon (dharma), directly witnessed, seen truly and without error. This is pratyakṣa observation; it is cognitive awareness (jñāna) with pratyakṣa wisdom. If it is not a presently existing phenomenon, not a phenomenon seen right before one's eyes, but merely thought out, speculated upon, or imagined by the isolated mental consciousness, it is purely non-valid cognition. The stock market situation does not exist right now; one can only see it the next day. The current viewpoint or conclusion is not derived from direct perception; the mental speculation or prediction is, of course, imagined non-valid cognition. No matter how accurate the prediction, it is not personally witnessed, not obtained through observing the stock market trend right now. Therefore, it is one hundred percent non-valid cognition.
Simultaneously, it is also not inference (anumāna), because there is no equal comparison between phenomena (dharmas). Anumāna is a conclusion derived from comparing two or more phenomena against each other; it involves the coexisting relationship of two or more phenomena, which can be mutually compared. Without comparison, a conclusion cannot be drawn, nor can a decision be made. Can the wisdom cognition (jñāna), mental state (citta), and experiential feeling (vedanā) of direct seeing and imagination be the same? Can the mental state and experiential feeling of watching a loved one gradually die right now be the same as imagining the future scene of that loved one's death? Imagining the death of a loved one—although everyone must inevitably die in the future—since the loved one is still alive now, can the mental state and experiential feeling be the same as directly witnessing the death?
Many people, based on the Tathāgatagarbha theory they have learned, and based on the various functions, roles, and essential nature (svabhāva) of Tathāgatagarbha, speculate that Tathāgatagarbha is located in a certain place, realm, sense faculty, or phenomenon, performing a certain function. Then they consider themselves to have personally realized Tathāgatagarbha, attained enlightenment (bodhi), understood the mind (citta), and become a sage (ārya). This misunderstanding is enormous, and the consequences are extremely grave. It is like a poor and lowly person imagining themselves becoming an emperor, taking this imagined state as real, and declaring themselves the emperor. When the real emperor finds out, he becomes furious, sends soldiers to arrest them, publicly executes them, and exterminates their nine generations of kin. Imagining Tathāgatagarbha performing a certain function and then claiming to be an enlightened sage has far more severe consequences than public execution and extermination of kin. One must be extremely cautious in spiritual practice.
Where does the problem of the grave false speech (mahā-mṛṣāvāda) lie? It lies in not understanding the difference between pratyakṣa and non-valid cognition, not understanding what constitutes pratyakṣa observation, not understanding that what is deduced, analyzed, or thought out is essentially non-valid cognition and not pratyakṣa observation. The failure to distinguish between pratyakṣa and non-valid cognition is a very serious problem. Many people are unaware that the conclusions they reach are guessed or speculated upon, absolutely not the direct seeing of pratyakṣa. Therefore, when they derive certain conclusions through reasoning, they consider themselves to have realized it through pratyakṣa, when in reality it is not so at all; it is non-valid imagination and speculation. Especially those without meditative concentration (dhyāna), it is all the functioning of mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) reasoning. Even those with shallow meditative concentration still have the functioning of mental consciousness reasoning. Even those with deep meditative concentration, if they are thinking at a moment when they are not in profound dhyāna and instead use mental consciousness thought, it is still the functioning of mental consciousness reasoning. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that having meditative concentration necessarily means realization through pratyakṣa.
10
+1