Who takes the mind consciousness and the manas as the self?

Question: My mind consciousness — who does this "I" refer to? Who does the mind consciousness belong to? My manas — who does this "I" refer to? Who does the manas belong to? My five aggregates — who does this "I" refer to? Who do the five aggregates belong to?

Ru Chun: In "my mind consciousness," this "I" refers both to the mind consciousness and to the manas; the mind consciousness belongs jointly to the seventh consciousness and the eighth consciousness. In "my manas," before one has realized the manas, this "I" mainly refers to the mind consciousness; the manas has coexisted with the eighth consciousness since beginningless kalpas, so it should be said that it does not belong to anyone, right? Or could one say that He belongs to Himself? In "my five aggregates," this "I" refers to the mind consciousness and the manas; the five aggregates belong jointly to the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. 

For example: the shop owner (the eighth consciousness) uses the seeds of the seven great elements as raw material, adds seasonings (conditions and causes), and then, according to the customer's request (the manas' thinking) and the amount paid (karmic seeds), makes a dumpling called the five aggregates and a dumpling called the mind consciousness. The five-aggregates dumpling and the mind-consciousness dumpling should be the product of cooperation between the shop owner and the customer, belonging to both of them; the shop owner and the customer are in a cooperative relationship, not one of subordination. I wonder if this understanding is correct — lately my mind likes to wander into random thoughts.

Assessment: When a person says "my mind consciousness," this "I" has two referents: one is the solitary consciousness (mano-vijñāna-eka-citta), and the other is the manas. The self-validating cognition (sva-saṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga) of the solitary consciousness can observe and validate itself; it has self-awareness and can take the mind consciousness' own functions as "mine," and it will also take the functions of the first five consciousnesses as "mine," and at the same time will also take the functions of the manas as "mine." The other "I" that takes the mind consciousness as "mine" is the manas; the manas takes all dharmas as "I," imputing them through the imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), and of course it will take the functions of the mind consciousness as "mine."

When someone says "my manas," this "I" also has two referents: one is the solitary consciousness, and the other is the manas itself. Because the manas possesses self-validating cognition (sva-saṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga), it can observe and validate itself and has the function of self-perception; it will therefore take its own functions as "mine." Whether or not one has realized the manas, the manas has this grasping nature. In summary, the "I" of sentient beings includes the mind consciousness and the manas; the "I" of the manas is stronger, is used more, and occupies the dominant position.

This question is not asking to discuss to whom the mind consciousness, the manas, and the five aggregates objectively belong; rather, it is asking who, subjectively, takes these dharmas as belonging to oneself. One must learn to read the question correctly, rather than relying solely on one's own speculation.