Commentary on the Great Vehicle's Śataśāstra (Mahāyāna-śataśāstra-vyākhyā), Volume 2

Original text:又诸我见略有二种。一者俱生。二者分别。俱生我见。由无始来。内因力故恒与身俱。不待邪教及邪分别。任运而起。故名俱生。此复二种。一常相续。在第七识缘第八识。起自心相。即执为我。名为我见。

Explanation: There are roughly two kinds of self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi): one is innate identity view (sahaja-satkāya-dṛṣṭi), and the other is imputed identity view (parikalpita-satkāya-dṛṣṭi). Innate identity view arises because, from beginningless kalpas, due to the power of internal causes, it has constantly accompanied the body. It does not depend on wrong teachings or wrong discrimination, but arises spontaneously; hence it is called "innate." This again has two kinds. The first is continuously present: it resides in the seventh consciousness (manas), which takes as its object the eighth consciousness and gives rise to the appearance of its own mind, grasping it as self; this is called self-view.

Innate identity view arises because, from beginningless kalpas, due to the power of the manas's own ignorance, it has followed the five aggregates (pañcaskandha) body life after life without ever abandoning it. It does not require the mind consciousness's wrong instruction, nor does it need to be influenced by the mind consciousness's wrong discriminations. The manas itself, in accord with conditions, can give rise to self-view, taking the five aggregates body as self and the self's possessions. Therefore it is called innate identity view—the self-view that the manas possesses from the moment the five aggregates body is born. Even in the mother's womb there is self-view, taking the embryo as self and the self's possessions.

Innate identity view can further be divided into two kinds. One is that which continues life after life without interruption, will not cease in the future, and will not end unless the self-view is truly eliminated and no longer arises. On what basis does this self-view exist? Because of the manas's beginningless ignorance, it takes all dharmas born of and grasped by the eighth consciousness as self and as belonging to self, thereby giving rise to grasping at all dharmas; this is called imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhāva). It has never known the true reality of the dharma realm, never known that all dharmas come from the eighth consciousness and belong to the eighth consciousness. Therefore this is called inverted view and mistaken grasping.

The manas's self-view, in general terms, is all called the self-view of dharmas (dharma-ātma-dṛṣṭi), taking all dharmas as one's own. Among these, the manas also takes the five aggregates born of and grasped by the eighth consciousness as self and as belonging to self; this is the inverted wrong view and mistaken grasping, called the self-view of the five aggregates. Because there is self-view, there is self-grasping (ātma-grāha). This self-view can only be eliminated through cultivating and studying the Four Noble Truths of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path. After it is eliminated, the manas's grasping at the five aggregates body can gradually lessen and be removed. When self-grasping is completely eliminated, one escapes the three realms and attains liberation.

Original text:二有间断。在第六识缘五取蕴。或总或别起自心相。即执为我。名为我见。如是二种俱生我见。微细难断。数数修习胜无我观。方能除灭。

Explanation: The second kind of innate identity view refers to the interrupted self-view of the mind consciousness. When the mind consciousness takes as its object the five grasped aggregates (pañca-upādānaskandha), it either takes the aggregate appearance of the five grasped aggregates as a whole as self and the self's possessions, or takes the individual appearances of the five grasped aggregates as self and the self's possessions, thus grasping the five grasped aggregates as self and the self's possessions. This is the mind consciousness's self-view. For the mind consciousness's self-view to arise, there must be a prerequisite: the mind consciousness must understand the appearances of the five aggregates, be able to recognize the appearances of the five aggregates, and comprehend the functions and contents of the five aggregates; only then can self-view arise. Otherwise, there is no self-view.

For example, when the mind consciousness takes the eye consciousness's function of seeing forms as self and the self's possessions, the mind consciousness must first know that it is seeing forms at this moment, that "I am seeing forms at this moment"; there must be the concept of "I" in the mind. If the concept of "I" has not yet been cultivated through habituation, there is no self-view. For example, when a baby is just born, it has no discriminative ability regarding its parents and does not recognize them, so anyone may hold it. When it grows a bit older and recognizes its parents, it knows "these are my parents," and then it will cling to its parents and dislike being held or cared for by others.

When a baby is just born, it has no discriminative ability regarding food, and its recognition of self is also unclear, so it will not take food as "mine" and cling to it without letting go. It is fine for parents to give the food to other children; the baby has no objection and will not cry or get angry. When it grows a bit older, it gains recognition of self and others, and recognition of food, clothing, toys, and so on; then there arises self-view and the view of what belongs to self, and it will cling to its own possessions and not allow others, for example, to touch them. Therefore, the mind consciousness's self-view is not innate; it arises through postnatal learning and cognition, and it also relies on the habituation by the manas that the self-view and the view of what belongs to self come into being.

These two kinds of innate identity view of the manas and the mind consciousness have very subtle modes of activity, and therefore are difficult to eliminate. Only by repeatedly cultivating the excellent contemplation of non-self and long-term habituation can they be extinguished. Therefore, eliminating the manas's innate identity view is not easy. If innate identity view is not eliminated, the manas's innate self-grasping cannot be eliminated, because self-grasping depends on self-view to exist; where there is self-view, there is self-grasping.

Original text:分别我见。由现在世外缘力故。非与身俱。要待邪教及邪分别。然后方起。故名分别。此亦二种。一缘邪教所说蕴相。起自心相。分别为我。名为我见。二缘邪教所说我相。起自心相。分别为我。名为我见。如是二种分别我见。

Explanation: The second kind of self-view is imputed identity view (parikalpita-satkāya-dṛṣṭi), which is also the self-view of the mind consciousness. This self-view arises due to the influence of the postnatal living environment; it is not born together with the five aggregates body, does not accompany the five aggregates body, and requires following others' wrong teachings, together with the arising of wrong discriminations, for the mind consciousness's self-view to exist. Then the mind consciousness's self-view goes on to influence the manas through habituation, thereby increasing the manas's self-view and self-grasping.

Imputed identity view is also divided into two kinds. One is based on others' incorrect teachings about the five aggregates, saying: this is the aggregate of form (rūpa), this is the aggregate of feeling (vedanā), the aggregate of perception (saṃjñā), the aggregate of formations (saṃskāra), and the aggregate of consciousness (vijñāna); this is my physical appearance, this is my feeling appearance, this is my cognitive appearance, this is my thoughts and views, this is my decision, this is what I did—and thus one takes all these functions and activities as one's own aggregates of form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. This is called imputed identity view.

The second kind of imputed identity view is based on others' wrong teachings about the appearance of self, saying: this is me, I am like this. Thus one takes all these appearances as self, the appearance of self arises in the mind, and there is self-view. These are the contents of the two kinds of imputed identity view as described.