An Explanation of the Twelve Nidānas in the Āgama Sutras
Chapter 6: The Madhyama Āgama — the Mahānidāna Sūtra (Excerpt)
Original text: 阿难。要如何观察我耶。阿难。对于受。或以受是我之我。或以受实非我之我。不得感受者。即是我之我。阿难。如是观察我。或以受实非我之我。又不得感受者。亦非我之我。我应依我之领纳。即受之法。始是我之我。阿难。如是观察我。
Explanation: The Buddha said: Ānanda, how should one observe the self? Ānanda, the observation of feeling is divided into three kinds. The first is that some people believe feeling is the self within the five-aggregate self. The second is that some people believe feeling is indeed not the self within the five-aggregate self, and that the one without any feeling is what is called the self within the five-aggregate self. Ānanda, some people observe the self in just this way. The third is that some people believe feeling is indeed not the self within the five-aggregate self, and that the one without any feeling is also not the self within the five-aggregate self; rather, I should rely on my function of receiving and experiencing—that is, the dharma of feeling—which is what is called the self within the five-aggregate self. Ānanda, some people observe the self in this way.
This excerpt discusses the dharma of the twelve links of dependent origination from the perspective of whether feeling is the self or is not the self. At the outset, the Buddha presented three kinds of people with three kinds of observation and the three conclusions they reached, all of which are incorrect. Below, the Buddha will dialectically demonstrate why they are incorrect; the evidence the Buddha presents is ample and irrefutable.
Original text: 阿难。此中对于言受是我之我者。不得不如是言。友。此受有三。是乐受苦受。不苦不乐受。此等三受之中。汝见何为我耶。阿难。若于某时。领纳乐受。其同时不领纳苦受。又不领纳不苦不乐受。其时应唯领纳乐受。
Explanation: Ānanda, to those first kinds of people who say that feeling is the self within the five-aggregate self, one cannot but speak as follows: Good friend, this feeling is of three kinds: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Among these three kinds of feeling, which one do you take to be the self? Ānanda, if at a certain time one is experiencing a pleasant feeling, then at the same time one is not experiencing a painful feeling, nor a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling; at that time one can only be experiencing a pleasant feeling.
Original text: 阿难。若又于某时。领纳苦受。其同时不领纳乐受。又不领纳不苦不乐受。其时应唯领纳苦受。阿难。若又于某时。领纳不苦不乐受。其同时不领纳乐受。又不领苦受。其时应唯领纳不苦不乐受。
Explanation: Ānanda, if at another time one is experiencing a painful feeling, then at that time one cannot simultaneously experience a pleasant feeling, nor a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling; at that time one can only experience the painful feeling. Ānanda, if at yet another time one is experiencing a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, then at that time one cannot simultaneously experience a pleasant feeling, nor a painful feeling; one can only experience the neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.
With the Buddha's exposition in this passage, it becomes easy for us to observe the self. If feeling is taken as the self, and feeling is of three kinds, then the self would be of three kinds. Yet at any one time, only one kind of feeling can exist, so only that kind of feeling would be the self, and the other two kinds would not be the self. This creates a contradiction; clearly, taking feeling as the self is incorrect. This shows that feeling is not the self. If feeling were the self, all three kinds of feeling should simultaneously be the self, but the three kinds of feeling cannot exist simultaneously—they are mutually exclusive—which shows that taking feeling as the self is erroneous.
Some will say that feeling is of course not this self which is the eighth consciousness. But can these words and the content of this observation be connected with the eighth consciousness? Clearly not, because śrāvakas are entirely incapable of directly observing the eighth consciousness in the present, so you cannot prove whether feeling is or is not the eighth consciousness. Even if you could prove that feeling is not the eighth consciousness, you still would not have realized that feeling is not the self, because this "self" does not refer to the eighth consciousness, but to the five-aggregate self that can act as the master. Especially for ordinary beings (pṛthagjana) among śrāvakas who have not yet eradicated the view of self (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), being unable to attain enlightenment and personally realize the eighth consciousness, it is impossible for them to reach such a conclusion that feeling is not the eighth consciousness. If the sequence of contemplative practice (vipaśyanā-caryā) is inverted, realization is impossible, because no one can imagine an eighth consciousness and then observe it directly in the present; what is imagined is called conjecture and speculation, which serves no purpose at all.
Original text: 阿难。乐受实是无常有为。缘起之法。灭尽之法。败坏之法。离欲之法。灭法也。阿难。苦受亦实是无常有为。缘起之法。灭尽之法。败坏之法。离欲之法。灭法也。阿难。不苦不乐受。亦实是无常有为。缘起之法。灭尽之法。败坏之法。离欲之法。灭法也。
Explanation: Ānanda, pleasant feeling is indeed impermanent and conditioned; it is a dharma arising from various conditions, a dharma that can cease entirely, a dharma subject to decay, a dharma from which one can depart through dispassion, a dharma that will perish. Ānanda, painful feeling is also indeed impermanent and conditioned; it is a dharma arising from various conditions, a dharma that can cease entirely, a dharma subject to decay, a dharma from which one can depart through dispassion, a dharma that will perish. Ānanda, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is also indeed impermanent and conditioned; it is a dharma arising from various conditions, a dharma that can cease entirely, a dharma subject to decay, a dharma from which one can depart through dispassion toward it, a dharma that can perish.
Original text: 若领纳乐受。还是思惟。此是我之我者。彼又依于乐受之灭。实应不得思惟。我之我灭。若领纳苦受。还是思惟。此是我之我者。彼又依于苦受之灭。实应不得思惟。我之我灭。若领纳不苦不乐受。还是思惟。此是我之我者，彼又依于不苦不乐受之灭。实应不得思惟。我之我灭。
Explanation: If, while experiencing a pleasant feeling, one still believes that this one experiencing the pleasant feeling is the self, then when one sees the pleasant feeling cease, one indeed should no longer believe that the self which experienced the pleasant feeling has perished. If, while experiencing a painful feeling, one still believes that the one experiencing the painful feeling is the self, then when one sees the painful feeling cease, one indeed should no longer believe that the self which experienced the painful feeling has perished. If, while experiencing a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, one still believes that the one experiencing the neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is the self, then when one sees the neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling cease, one indeed should no longer believe that the self which experienced the neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling has perished.
Original text: 对如是言。受是我之我者。要于现见之法。观察我是无常。乐苦皆归于消灭之生灭法。阿难。是故依此。不可能观察。受是我之我。
Explanation: To those first kinds of people who hold the view that feeling is the self within the five-aggregate self, one should, among the dharmas directly visible in the present, observe that this self is impermanent, and that pleasant and painful feelings both belong to conditioned dharmas of arising and ceasing that end in cessation. Ānanda, therefore, based on the fact that feeling is an impermanent phenomenon of arising and ceasing, it is impossible to observe that feeling is the self within the five-aggregate self.
Original text: 阿难。此中又言。受实非我之我。不得感受者。即是我之我。对彼应如是言。友。无一切所受之处。于其处。还得思惟有我耶。世尊。实不然。阿难。是故依此。不可能观察。受实非我之我。不得感受者，即是我之我。
Explanation: Ānanda, the second kind of person further says: feeling is indeed not the self within the five-aggregate self, and the perception, volitional formations, and consciousness apart from feeling, which have no feeling, are what constitute the self within the five-aggregate self. To those who hold such a wrong view, one should ask as follows: Good friend, in a place where there is no experiencing of anything at all—in that place, that is, the place of form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness—do you still believe there is a self in form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness? Ānanda replied: Truly, one should not believe that form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness are the self. The Buddha said: Ānanda, therefore, according to this reasoning, it is impossible to observe that: feeling is indeed not the self within the five-aggregate self, while the form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness apart from feeling are the self.
Original text: 阿难。此中又言。受实非我之我。我之我亦非不得感受者。我应依我之领纳。即我之我是受法。对彼应如是言。友。一切感受完全消灭时。即无一切受。由此受之灭。还得有思惟。于此有我之我耶。世尊。实不然。是故阿难。依此不可能观察。受实非我之我。不得感受者。亦非我之我。我应我之领纳。即我是受法。
Explanation: Ānanda, the third kind of person further says: feeling is indeed not the self within the five-aggregate self, and I am also not the form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness that are without feeling; I should rely on my nature of receiving and experiencing—that is to say, the self within the five-aggregate self is the dharma of feeling. To those who hold such a notion, one should speak as follows: Good friend, when all experiencing has completely ceased, there is no feeling of any kind. With the cessation of this feeling, can one still hold the thought that there is a self here? Ānanda replied: Truly, it is not so. The Buddha said: Therefore, Ānanda, based on this, it is impossible to observe that: feeling is indeed not the self, the form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness apart from feeling are also not the self, I rely on my nature of receiving and experiencing—that is, the experiencing is me, and I am the dharma of feeling that experiences.
There are five kinds of self that sentient beings believe in. The first is the self of form: taking the aggregate of form as the self, believing that "I am the aggregate of form, and the aggregate of form is me." The second is the self of feeling: taking feeling as the self, believing that "I am feeling, and feeling is me." The third is the self of perception: taking perception as the self, believing that "I am perception, and perception is me." The fourth is the self of volitional formations: taking volitional formations as the self, believing that "I am volitional formations, and volitional formations are me." The fifth is the self of consciousness: taking consciousness as the self, believing that "I am consciousness, and consciousness is me." When sentient beings take feeling as the self, they will harbor the notion of a "self of feeling" in their minds. When sentient beings have not eradicated the view of self (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), they either take any one of the five kinds of self as the self and regard the rest as belonging to the self (ātmīya), or take all five appropriating aggregates as the self—this is the domain of the view of self.
Original text: 阿难。是故比丘。不观察受是我。亦不观察。不得感受者是我。又不观察。我应依我之领纳。即我之我是受法。不观如是之我者。彼于世间之任何者。皆不执着。不执着故。无有恐怖。无有恐怖故。唯独般涅槃。自知生已尽。梵行已立。所作已作。更无后有。
Explanation: Ānanda, therefore, bhikṣus should not take feeling as the self, nor should they take form, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness as the self, nor should they rely on their nature of receiving and experiencing, nor should they hold the notion that "I am the dharma of feeling." Those who do not take these dharmas as the self will, when facing any dharma whatsoever, not give rise to attachment, and their minds will have no terror. Because there is no terror, they will solely attain parinirvāṇa; they will know for themselves that birth has been exhausted, the holy life has been established, what was to be done has been done, and there will be no more future existence.
Original text: 阿难。如是。心解脱之比丘。不问如来。死后有耶。若彼执着是言者。彼则非正。不问如来。死后无耶。若彼执着是言者。彼则非正。
Explanation: Ānanda, it is like this: a bhikṣu liberated in mind will not ask the Tathāgata whether there is future existence after death. If a bhikṣu insistently holds the view that there is existence in the three realms after death, then he has not yet perfected right view, has not entered the correct position of an arhat, and is not an arhat liberated in mind. A bhikṣu liberated in mind will also not ask the Tathāgata whether all dharmas cease to exist after death. If a bhikṣu insistently believes that all dharmas perish after his death, he has not yet perfected right view, has not entered the correct position of an arhat, and is not an arhat liberated in mind.
Original text: 不问如来。死后亦有亦无耶。若彼执着是言者。彼则非正。不问如来。死后亦非有。亦非无耶。若彼执着是言者。彼则非正。
Explanation: A bhikṣu liberated in mind will not ask the Tathāgata whether after death there is both future existence and no future existence. If he insistently believes that after his death there is both existence and non-existence, he lacks right view, has not entered the correct position of an arhat, and is not an arhat liberated in mind. A bhikṣu liberated in mind will not ask the Tathāgata whether after death there is neither future existence nor the absence of future existence. If he insistently believes that after his death there is neither existence nor non-existence of future existence, he has not yet perfected right view, has not entered the correct position of an arhat, and is not an arhat liberated in mind.
An arhat of the fourth fruit who has entered the correct position is liberated in mind, liberated in everything, and liberated in view as well; he will not hold that after death there is existence, or non-existence, or both existence and non-existence, or neither existence nor non-existence. In his mind, all wrong views are utterly extinguished, and he no longer clings to whether after death there is existence or non-existence. Whether one clings to existence, non-existence, or neither existence nor non-existence after death, only when all thoughts, notions, and attachments are extinguished can liberation be attained; at the end of life, one enters nirvāṇa without remainder (Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa).
