Chapter Six   The Great Discourse on Causation from the Madhyama Āgama (Excerpt)

Original Text: Ānanda, how should one observe the self? Ānanda, regarding feeling (vedanā), some regard feeling as the self within the self; some regard feeling as indeed not the self within the self, and that which does not experience feeling is the self within the self. Ānanda, thus some observe the self. Or, some regard feeling as indeed not the self within the self, and that which does not experience feeling is also not the self within the self; I should rely on my faculty of reception, that is, the dhamma of feeling, which is the self within the self. Ānanda, thus some observe the self.

Commentary: The Buddha said: Ānanda, how should one observe me? Ānanda, the observation of feeling is divided into three kinds. First, some regard feeling as the self among the five aggregates (pañcakkhandhā). Second, some regard feeling as indeed not the self among the five aggregates, and that which has no feeling at all is what is called the self among the five aggregates. Ānanda, some observe me in this way. Third, some regard feeling as indeed not the self among the five aggregates, and that which has no feeling is also not the self among the five aggregates; I should rely on my faculty of reception, that is, the dhamma of feeling is what is called the self among the five aggregates. Ānanda, some observe me in this way.

This excerpt explains the twelve links of dependent origination from the perspective of whether feeling is the self or not the self. The Buddha first presented three methods of observation used by three kinds of people and the three conclusions they reached, all of which are incorrect. Below, the Buddha will dialectically demonstrate why they are incorrect, providing irrefutable arguments.

Original Text: Ānanda, herein, for those who say feeling is the self within the self, one must say this: Friend, this feeling is of three kinds: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Among these three feelings, which one do you see as the self? Ānanda, when at a certain time one experiences pleasant feeling, at that same time one does not experience painful feeling, nor does one experience neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. At that time, one experiences only pleasant feeling.

Commentary: Ānanda, for those first kind of people who say feeling is the self among the five aggregates, one must say this: Good friend, this feeling has three kinds: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Among these three feelings, which one do you take as the self? Ānanda, when at a certain time one experiences pleasant feeling, one cannot simultaneously experience painful feeling nor neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. At that time, one experiences only pleasant feeling.

Original Text: Ānanda, if again at a certain time one experiences painful feeling, at that same time one does not experience pleasant feeling, nor does one experience neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. At that time, one experiences only painful feeling. Ānanda, if again at a certain time one experiences neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, at that same time one does not experience pleasant feeling, nor does one experience painful feeling. At that time, one experiences only neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.

Commentary: Ānanda, if at another time one experiences painful feeling, then at that time one cannot simultaneously experience pleasant feeling nor neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. At that time, one experiences only painful feeling. Ānanda, if at a certain time one experiences neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, then at that time one cannot simultaneously experience pleasant feeling nor painful feeling. One experiences only neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.

The Buddha's exposition here makes it easier to observe the self. If one takes feeling as the self, and feeling has three kinds, then the self has three kinds. But at any single time, only one kind of feeling exists, so only that feeling is the self, while the other two kinds are not the self. This creates a contradiction. Clearly, taking feeling as the self is incorrect. This demonstrates that feeling is not the self. If feeling were the self, all three feelings should simultaneously be the self, but the three feelings cannot coexist simultaneously; they are mutually exclusive. This shows that taking feeling as the self is erroneous.

Someone might say that feeling is certainly not the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), this self. But can these words and the content of observation be connected to the eighth consciousness? Clearly not, because all Śrāvakas cannot directly observe the eighth consciousness; one cannot prove whether feeling is the eighth consciousness or not. Even if one could prove that feeling is not the eighth consciousness, one still has not realized that feeling is not the self, because this "self" does not refer to the eighth consciousness but to the self among the five aggregates that is capable of agency. Especially ordinary Śrāvakas who have not severed the view of self cannot awaken to and realize the eighth consciousness; thus, it is impossible for them to reach the conclusion that feeling is not the eighth consciousness. If the sequence of observation is inverted, realization is impossible, because no one can imagine an eighth consciousness to observe directly; what is imagined is mere conjecture and speculation, which is useless.

Original Text: Ānanda, pleasant feeling is indeed impermanent, conditioned, a dependently arisen phenomenon, a phenomenon subject to cessation, a phenomenon subject to decay, a phenomenon of fading away, a phenomenon subject to cessation. Ānanda, painful feeling is also indeed impermanent, conditioned, a dependently arisen phenomenon, a phenomenon subject to cessation, a phenomenon subject to decay, a phenomenon of fading away, a phenomenon subject to cessation. Ānanda, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is also indeed impermanent, conditioned, a dependently arisen phenomenon, a phenomenon subject to cessation, a phenomenon subject to decay, a phenomenon of fading away, a phenomenon subject to cessation.

Commentary: Ānanda, pleasant feeling is indeed an impermanent, conditioned phenomenon, a phenomenon arisen from various causes and conditions, a phenomenon capable of cessation, a decaying phenomenon, a phenomenon that allows for the abandonment of craving for this feeling, a phenomenon that will cease. Ānanda, painful feeling is also indeed an impermanent, conditioned phenomenon, a phenomenon arisen from various causes and conditions, a phenomenon capable of cessation, a decaying phenomenon, a phenomenon that allows for the abandonment of craving, a phenomenon that will cease. Ānanda, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is also indeed an impermanent, conditioned phenomenon, a phenomenon arisen from various causes and conditions, a phenomenon capable of cessation, a decaying phenomenon, a phenomenon that allows for the abandonment of craving for this feeling, a phenomenon capable of cessation.

Original Text: When one experiences pleasant feeling, if one still thinks, 'This is the self within the self,' then when pleasant feeling ceases, one should indeed not think, 'The self within the self ceases.' When one experiences painful feeling, if one still thinks, 'This is the self within the self,' then when painful feeling ceases, one should indeed not think, 'The self within the self ceases.' When one experiences neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one still thinks, 'This is the self within the self,' then when neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling ceases, one should indeed not think, 'The self within the self ceases.'

Commentary: When experiencing pleasant feeling, if one still thinks that what experiences pleasant feeling is the self, yet upon seeing pleasant feeling cease, one should indeed not think that the self which experiences pleasant feeling ceases. When experiencing painful feeling, if one still thinks that what experiences painful feeling is the self, then upon seeing painful feeling cease, one should indeed not think that the self which experiences painful feeling ceases. When experiencing neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one still thinks that what experiences neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is the self, then upon seeing neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling cease, one should indeed not think that the self which experiences neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling ceases.

Original Text: For one who speaks thus, 'Feeling is the self within the self,' one must observe, within the presently seen phenomena, that this self is impermanent, that pleasant and painful feelings all belong to arising and ceasing phenomena subject to destruction. Ānanda, therefore, based on this, it is impossible to observe that feeling is the self within the self.

Commentary: For the first kind of person who holds the view that feeling is the self among the five aggregates, one should observe, within the phenomena accessible in the present, that this self is impermanent, that pleasant feeling and painful feeling all belong to arising and ceasing phenomena subject to destruction. Ānanda, therefore, based on the phenomenon of feeling being impermanent and subject to arising and cessation, it is impossible to observe that feeling is the self among the five aggregates.

Original Text: Ānanda, herein, for one who says, 'Feeling is indeed not the self within the self; that which does not experience feeling is the self within the self,' one should say this to him: Friend, where there is no feeling whatsoever, at that place, can one still think there is a self? Venerable sir, indeed not. Ānanda, therefore, based on this, it is impossible to observe that feeling is indeed not the self within the self, and that which does not experience feeling is the self within the self.

Commentary: Ānanda, the second kind of person says: Feeling is indeed not the self among the five aggregates; rather, that which is apart from feeling and has no feeling—namely form, perception, formations, and consciousness—is the self among the five aggregates. To such a person holding wrong views, one should ask: Good friend, where there is no pleasant feeling, painful feeling, nor neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling—that is, in the places of form, perception, formations, and consciousness—do you still think that form, perception, formations, and consciousness constitute the self? Ānanda replied: Indeed, one should not regard form, perception, formations, and consciousness as the self. The Buddha said: Ānanda, therefore, based on this statement, it is impossible to observe that feeling is indeed not the self within the five aggregates, and that which is apart from feeling—form, perception, formations, and consciousness—is the self.

Original Text: Ānanda, herein, for one who says, 'Feeling is indeed not the self within the self; the self within the self is also not that which does not experience feeling; I should rely on my faculty of reception, that is, the self within the self is the dhamma of feeling,' one should say this to him: Friend, when all feeling is completely extinguished, that is, when there is no feeling whatsoever, due to the cessation of feeling, can one still think that at this point there is a self within the self? Venerable sir, indeed not. Therefore, Ānanda, based on this, it is impossible to observe that feeling is indeed not the self within the self, that which does not experience feeling is also not the self within the self, I should rely on my faculty of reception, that is, I am the dhamma of feeling.

Commentary: Ānanda, the third kind of person says: Feeling is indeed not the self within the five aggregates; I am also not the non-feeling aggregates of form, perception, and formations; I should rely on my faculty of reception, that is, the self among the five aggregates is the dhamma of feeling. To a person holding such a view, one should say: Good friend, when all feelings are completely extinguished, there are no feelings whatsoever. Because feeling has ceased, do you still think that the dhamma of feeling which experiences is the self among the five aggregates? Ānanda replied: Feeling is indeed not the self. The Buddha said: Ānanda, therefore, relying on the experiencing faculty of feeling, it is impossible to observe that feeling is indeed not the self, that which is apart from feeling (form, perception, formations) is also not the self, I accept my faculty of reception, that is, reception is me, I am the experiencing dhamma of feeling.

Sentient beings hold five kinds of views regarding the self. The first is the self as form (rūpātman), taking the aggregate of form as the self, thinking "I am form, form is me." The second is the self as feeling (vedanātman), taking feeling as the self, thinking "I am feeling, feeling is me." The third is the self as perception (saññātman), taking perception as the self, thinking "I am perception, perception is me." The fourth is the self as formations (saṅkhārātman), taking formations as the self, thinking "I am formations, formations is me." The fifth is the self as consciousness (viññāṇātman), taking consciousness as the self, thinking "I am consciousness, consciousness is me." When sentient beings take feeling as the self, the mental notion of "I as feeling" arises in their minds. When sentient beings have not severed the view of self, they either take one of these five kinds of self as the self and regard the others as belonging to the self, or they take all five aggregates subject to clinging as the self. This is the scope of the view of self.

Original Text: Ānanda, therefore, a bhikkhu does not observe feeling as the self; nor does he observe that which does not experience feeling as the self; nor does he observe that he should rely on his faculty of reception, that is, that the self within the self is the dhamma of feeling. One who does not observe such a self, for him, regarding anything in the world, there is no clinging. Because there is no clinging, there is no fear. Because there is no fear, he attains final Nibbāna alone. He knows directly: 'Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming back to any state of being.'

Commentary: Ānanda, therefore, bhikkhus should not regard feeling as the self, nor should they regard form, perception, formations, and consciousness as the self, nor should they rely on their faculty of reception, nor should they hold the notion that the self is the dhamma of feeling. One who does not regard these phenomena as the self will not give rise to clinging towards any phenomenon. His mind will be without fear. Because he is without fear, he will only attain final Nibbāna (parinirvāṇa). He will know directly that birth is ended, the holy life has been established, what had to be done for the sake of liberation in this life has been done, and there is no more experiencing of states of becoming in the future.

Original Text: Ānanda, thus, a bhikkhu whose mind is liberated does not ask the Tathāgata: 'After death, does the self exist?' If he clings to such a statement, he is not correct. He does not ask the Tathāgata: 'After death, does the self not exist?' If he clings to such a statement, he is not correct.

Commentary: Ānanda, like this, a mind-liberated bhikkhu does not ask the Tathāgata, 'After I die, does a future state of existence (bhava) exist?' If the bhikkhu clings to the view that after death a state of existence within the three realms remains, then he has not attained right knowledge and vision, has not entered the stage of Arahantship, and is not a mind-liberated Arahant. A mind-liberated bhikkhu also does not ask the Tathāgata, 'After I die, do all phenomena cease to exist?' If the bhikkhu clings to the view that after death all phenomena are annihilated, he has not attained right knowledge and vision, has not entered the stage of Arahantship, and is not a mind-liberated Arahant.

Original Text: He does not ask the Tathāgata: 'After death, does the self both exist and not exist?' If he clings to such a statement, he is not correct. He does not ask the Tathāgata: 'After death, is the self neither existent nor non-existent?' If he clings to such a statement, he is not correct.

Commentary: A mind-liberated bhikkhu does not ask the Tathāgata, 'After I die, does a future state of existence both exist and not exist?' If he clings to the view that after death he both exists and does not exist, he has not attained right knowledge and vision, has not entered the stage of Arahantship, and is not a mind-liberated Arahant. A mind-liberated bhikkhu does not ask the Tathāgata, 'After I die, is a future state of existence neither existent nor non-existent?' If he clings to the view that after death he neither exists nor does not exist, he has not attained right knowledge and vision, has not entered the stage of Arahantship, and is not a mind-liberated Arahant.

A fourth-stage Arahant (catuṭṭha-ariya) who has entered the right stage is mind-liberated; everything is liberated, his knowledge and vision are liberated. He does not hold the view that after death he exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist. His mind extinguishes all wrong views and knowledge. He no longer clings to whether he exists or does not exist after death. Regardless of clinging to existence, non-existence, or neither-existence-nor-non-existence after death, only when all thoughts and clinging are extinguished can liberation be attained. At the end of life, he enters final Nibbāna without residue (anupādisesa-nibbāna).