Commentary on the Śataśāstra (Catuḥśataka-vṛtti)

眼谓眼光，是眼用故，不离眼故，亦得眼名。若此眼光，行至色处，何故远色，见不淹迟。如何月轮，与诸近色，举目齐见，无迟速耶。未见世间，有行动物，一时俱至，远近二方。由是因缘，应立比量，照远色见，不至远色，照近色见，时无异故。

Explanation: The eye is the eye consciousness, because it is what the eye faculty employs; since it does not depart from the eye faculty, it is also given the name "eye" (consciousness). If the eye consciousness could travel to the location of material sense-objects, then why is it that when seeing distant forms, the eye consciousness does not see them any later than near forms? Why is it that the moon in the sky and the near forms before one's eyes are all seen simultaneously upon raising the eyes, with no difference in speed? One has never seen anything in the world that moves and can arrive at two places, far and near, at the same time. For this reason, an inference should be established: the seeing that illuminates distant forms does not reach the distant forms; the seeing that illuminates near forms—because there is no difference in time.

Why exactly does the eye consciousness see distant and near forms simultaneously? The eye does not reach forms, and forms do not reach the eye, yet seeing occurs; the ear does not reach sounds, and sounds do not reach the ear, yet there is the nature of hearing—this is truly inconceivable. If it is explained by means of the supreme faculty (rūpa-prasāda), it becomes very easy to understand: what the six consciousnesses see are all the six sense-objects within the supreme faculty; the inner six sense-objects are all within the supreme faculty, so how could there be any notion of far and near? No matter how far or near a material sense-object is, once it is transmitted into the supreme faculty, there is no distinction of far and near—all are images. The conscious mind, in discerning, can simultaneously apprehend these images; it is not discerning the substantial external material sense-objects. Only if it discerned external material sense-objects would there be any notion of far and near. And the tathāgatagarbha can discern external material sense-objects, but for the tathāgatagarbha, external material sense-objects likewise have no notion of far and near.